Harmonic Resonance

From Steven Lehar,

The conventional view of neuroscience, known as the neuron doctrine, is based on the assumption that neurocomputation involves discrete signals communicated along fixed transmission lines between discrete computational elements. This atomistic concept is shown to be inadequate to account for invariance in recognition, and perceptual completion phenomena. It is also inconsistent with the holistic global aspects of perception identified by Gestalt theory. A harmonic resonance theory is presented as an alternative paradigm of neurocomputation, in which electrochemical standing waves in the neural substrate are proposed as the principle pattern formation mechanism in the brain, to replace the template-like concept of the spatial receptive field. The principle of harmonic resonance exhibits both the property of invariance, and the emergent Gestalt properties of perception, not as special mechanisms contrived to achieve those properties, but as natural properties of the resonance itself.

Neuroscience is in a state of serious crisis. For although our knowledge of the neurophysiological and biomolecular properties of the brain continues to advance by leaps and bounds, there has been no real progress in our understanding of the most fundamental questions of information representation and processing in the brain. In fact we have no idea what the correct level of description should be to capture the essential aspects of neurocomputation, because there is no universally accepted theory of how the brain codes information, a problem that Searle (1997, p. 198) has called "the dirty secret of contemporary neuroscience". Neuroscience therefore remains in what Kuhn called a pre-paradigmatic state, with no real consensus on the foundational assumptions or elemental principles of the science. Curiously there is always a great deal of resistance in neuroscience to discussion of alternative paradigmatic hypotheses. This conservative tendency stems from a general misunderstanding of the role of theories as opposed to paradigms in scientific investigation. For while theories are accepted or rejected using the well established procedures of scientific evidence, debates over alternative paradigms require a more general handling, as discussed by Kuhn (1970). The reason for this is that the paradigm represents the philosophical infrastructure, or set of initial assumptions upon which theories are built. Therefore debates between competing paradigms cannot be resolved by the normal rules of evidence, because the interpretation of the evidence itself depends on one's paradigmatic assumptions (Kuhn 1970). Furthermore, the older paradigm which is challenged by the new hypothesis is itself merely a hypothesis which was never proven beyond a reasonable doubt, and therefore the new proposal should not be held to a higher standard of proof merely because it is proposed at a later date. In contemporary neuroscience this default concept of neurocomputation is a set of assumptions which has come to be known as the neuron doctrine (Barlow 1972, 1995, Shepard 1991). While the neuron doctrine is by no means universally accepted, and alternative paradigms have been proposed, it remains nevertheless the dominant paradigm in the sense that authors who adopt its tenets as initial assumptions are not challenged to justify that choice. However the only reason the neuron doctrine has achieved this status is more a matter of historical precedent and absence of viable alternatives, rather than due to any intrinsic merits of its own. Although the neuron doctrine serves adequately as a model of the individual neuron, this paradigm is much more problematic as a general theory of neurocomputation and representation in the brain.

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